Professor Barney Jordaan has kindly contributed the following comment to my forthcoming book, the 2nd Edition of the Contentious Probate Handbook. This will be inserted at the top of the 50 page section in the book in which I discuss ‘Mediation Advocacy’. I would like to take this opportunbity to thank him for providing this. The book is scheduled for publication by the Law Society in mid to late February 2025.

‘Lawyers who are accustomed to litigation and who are required to represent a client in a mediation process often face a steep learning curve. Unlike the case in litigation, in legal or business mediations the goal is not to win a case but to discover the hidden drivers of a conflict or dispute – the parties’ underlying needs, interests and concerns – and then to cooperatively work with the mediator and the other party to find an agreed solution that satisfies those. Whereas the legal algorithm goes something like this: Law + Facts = (objective) Justice, the mediation algorithm reads: Interests + Consensus = (subjective) Justice.

Whereas in litigation lawyers are required to look after the client’s best interests through partisan, zealous promotion of the client’s case, as mediation advocates their task is to zealously pursue satisfaction of their client’s key interests through an understanding of all aspects of a dispute, and collaboratively working with the other party and the mediator to find a solution that represents a better alternative than pursuing a win-lose outcome in litigation. This requires, among others, familiarity with collaborative negotiation and joint problem-solving techniques and adopting a less adversarial attitude in favour of a more helpful, solution-focuses one.

While a lot has been written about mediation, mediation advocacy has been neglected, until now. This book goes a long way to filling that gap. It provides practical advice about how to become an effective mediation advocate from the author’s own rich experience as mediator and party representative. While its focus is on advocacy in trust and estate disputes, it has far wider appeal and relevance for mediation in other legal fields as well. It is an indispensable guide for lawyers who would like to expand their practice into the mediation space.’

(Barney Jordaan, LL.D (Stellenbosch University), Professor at Vlerick Business School, Belgium, Extraordinary Professor at Stellenbosch Business School, South Africa, Negotiation and Dispute Resolution Practitioner, Internationally Accredited Mediator, and author of ‘Negotiation And Dispute Resolution For Lawyers’ (2022), published by Edward Elgar Publishing).

The following principles were stated by Mr Andrew Sutcliffe KC in Armstrong v Armstrong & Anor [2024] EWHC 2989 (Ch) (22 November 2024): https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2024/2989.pdf

• Testamentary freedom is firmly rooted in English law.
• It is a well established principle that a private individual is entitled to dispose of his property in any way he chooses: see Blathwayt v Baron Cawley [1976] AC 397.
• In order [for C] to establish his claim in proprietary estoppel, he must prove that [T] made him an unambiguous promise which reasonably appeared intended to have been taken seriously and which [C] could reasonably have understood as being one on which he could rely (the promise requirement); he reasonably relied on that promise and as a result of such reasonable reliance, he suffered substantial detriment (the reliance and detriment requirements).
• In order to fulfil the promise requirement [C] must prove that he believed the promises or assurances made to him by [T]  were binding and irrevocable. Neither statements made to [C]  as to [T’s]  current intention nor mere encouragement by [T]  to believe that he would inherit the farm would be enough.
• What is required is a promise which was intended to be taken as such.
• The stringency of the need for the relevant statement to be made with the intention of it being taken as a serious promise which could reasonably be relied on is illustrated by the decision in Cook v Thomas [2010] EWCA Civ 227, in which the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding that words substantially along the lines of the property in dispute “all going to be yours when I am gone” were insufficient to constitute a promise on which an estoppel could arise but were rather an indication of the deceased’s then expectation that if all proceeded smoothly the defendants would be allowed to live at the farmhouse after the deceased’s death: see [35] and [36].
• Similarly, in James v James [2018] EWHC 43 (Ch), the court found that statements made to the claimant by his father that he would inherit the farm after his death were insufficient to fulfil the promise requirement as they were merely a statement of his then current intentions: see [24].
• That was so notwithstanding that the court accepted that the claimant, as the only son of a farming family, reasonably expected to inherit his father’s farm and that such expectation was shared by other members of the family: see [30].
• The question of how clear the promise or assurance must be is dependent on the context in which it was made. As Lord Walker said in Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776, HL at [56]: “I would prefer to say (while conscious that it is a thoroughly question-begging formulation) that to establish a proprietary estoppel the relevant assurance must be clear enough.
• What amounts to sufficient clarity, in a case of this sort, is hugely dependent on context. I respectfully concur in the way Hoffmann LJ put it in Walton v Walton [1994] (in which the mother’s “stock phrase” to her son, who had worked for low wages on her farm since he left school at 15, was “You can’t have more money and a farm one day”). Hoffmann LJ stated, at para 16: “The promise must be unambiguous and must appear to have been intended to be taken seriously.
• Taken in its context, it must have been a promise which one might reasonably expect to be relied upon by the person to whom it was made.”
• The relevant promise must be made by the person with the interest himself or with his actual authority. If that actual authority is missing, it makes no difference if a claimant believes that the person making the promise had such authority: see Fielden v Christie-Miller [2015] EWHC 87 at [25]-[26].
• The reliance and detriment requirements 12 13 14 15 Any detriment which a claimant suffers is only relevant to the issue of proprietary estoppel to the extent that it was carried out in reliance on the promisor’s promise.
• The reliance requirement therefore raises an issue of causation: see Snell’s Equity (34th Ed.) at (12-043). In order for the reliance element to be fulfilled it is necessary to establish that the course of action which is said to have given rise to the detriment was undertaken on the faith of the promise and not merely in its belief: see Taylor’s Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] QB 133 at 156C.
• The reliance requirement is generally stated as requiring proof of a “sufficient causal link between the assurance relied on and the detriment asserted”: see Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 at 232E-F.
• In practice, this amounts to the “but for” test (i.e. but for the promise would the claimant have acted in the way that is said to have given rise to the detriment): see Snell’s Equity (34th Ed.) (at 12-043) and The Law of Proprietary Estoppel (2nd Ed.) by Ben Macfarlane (at 3.112-3.113 and 3.174-3.187).
• As to detriment, this must result directly from the reasonable reliance: see Thorner v Major at [29]. It must also be detriment suffered by the claimant directly. Detriment suffered by parties related to him is not relevant: see The Law of Proprietary Estoppel (2nd Ed.) by Ben Macfarlane (at 4.107 to 4.112). Detriment is “not a narrow or technical concept.
• The detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial”: see Gillett v Holt at 232D-E.
• In testing detriment, the court does not undertake an exercise in forensic accounting but must “stand back and look at the matter in the round”: see Gillett v Holt at 233H.
• In assessing whether the requirement of substantial detriment has been met, the court must take into account any countervailing benefits acquired by the claimant as a result of his reliance: see Snell’s Equity (34th Ed.) (at 12-044).
• This requires the court to weigh the disadvantages suffered by the claimant against any countervailing advantages: see Henry v Henry [2010] 1 All ER 988 at [53].

Case summary:

A farmer [‘C‘] succeeded in his proprietary estoppel claim against the estate of his late father (Armstrong v Armstrong, 2024 EWHC 2989 Ch). The testator [‘T‘] made a new will in January 2020 only months before his death, thereby repudiating his son’s reasonable expectation of inheriting his farm in accordance with promises made to him for more than 35 years. The High Court also concluded that T failed to make reasonable financial provision for his son in his will.

Extract from the judgment:

The Proprietary Estoppel Claim

6                 Testamentary freedom is firmly rooted in English law. It is a well established principle that a private individual is entitled to dispose of his property in any way he chooses: see Blathwayt v Baron Cawley [1976] AC 397. Alan was fully entitled to change his will shortly before his death by leaving the farm to his grandson and nothing to Richard, unless Richard is able to establish that Alan was prevented from doing so by the doctrine of proprietary estoppel or that he has a claim on Alan’s estate by virtue of the provisions of the 1975 Act. I consider first Richard’s proprietary estoppel claim because it is his primary claim. His claim under the 1975 Act is only brought in the alternative.

The law on proprietary estoppel

7                 In order to establish his claim in proprietary estoppel, Richard must prove that:

7.1           Alan made him an unambiguous promise which reasonably appeared intended to have been taken seriously and which Richard could reasonably have understood as being one on which he could rely (the promise requirement);

7.2           he reasonably relied on that promise and as a result of such reasonable reliance, he suffered substantial detriment (the reliance and detriment requirements).

The promise requirement

8                 In order to fulfil the promise requirement, Richard must prove that he believed the promises or assurances made to him by Alan were binding and irrevocable. Neither statements made to Richard as to Alan’s current intention nor mere encouragement by Alan to Richard to believe that he would inherit the farm would be enough. What is required is a promise which was intended to be taken as such.

9                 The stringency of the need for the relevant statement to be made with the intention of it being taken as a serious promise which could reasonably be relied on is illustrated by the decision in Cook v Thomas [2010] EWCA Civ 227, in which the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge’s finding that words substantially along the lines of the property in dispute “all going to be yours when I am gone” were insufficient to constitute a promise on which an estoppel could arise but were rather an indication of the deceased’s then expectation that if all proceeded smoothly the defendants would be allowed to live at the farmhouse after the deceased’s death: see [35] and [36]. Similarly, in James v James [2018] EWHC 43 (Ch), the court found that statements made to the claimant by his father that he would inherit the farm after his death were insufficient to fulfil the promise requirement as they were merely a statement of his then current intentions: see [24]. That was so notwithstanding that the court accepted that the claimant, as the only son of a farming family, reasonably expected to inherit his father’s farm and that such expectation was shared by other members of the family: see [30].

10             The question of how clear the promise or assurance must be is dependent on the context in which it was made. As Lord Walker said in Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776, HL at [56]:

“I would prefer to say (while conscious that it is a thoroughly question-begging formulation) that to establish a proprietary estoppel the relevant assurance must be clear enough. What amounts to sufficient clarity, in a case of this sort, is hugely dependent on context. I respectfully concur in the way Hoffmann LJ put it in Walton v Walton [1994] CA Transcript No 479 (in which the mother’s “stock phrase” to her son, who had worked for low wages on her farm since he left school at 15, was “You can’t have more money and a farm one day”). Hoffmann LJ stated, at para 16:

“The promise must be unambiguous and must appear to have been intended to be taken seriously. Taken in its context, it must have been a promise which one might reasonably expect to be relied upon by the person to whom it was made.”

11              The relevant promise must be made by the person with the interest himself or with his actual authority. If that actual authority is missing, it makes no difference if a claimant believes that the person making the promise had such authority: see Fielden v Christie-Miller [2015] EWHC 87 at [25]-[26].

The reliance and detriment requirements

12              Any detriment which a claimant suffers is only relevant to the issue of proprietary estoppel to the extent that it was carried out in reliance on the promisor’s promise. The reliance requirement therefore raises an issue of causation: see Snell’s Equity (34^th Ed.) at (12-043). In order for the reliance element to be fulfilled it is necessary to establish that the course of action which is said to have given rise to the detriment was undertaken on the faith of the promise and not merely in its belief: see Taylor’s Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd [1982] QB 133 at 156C.

13              The reliance requirement is generally stated as requiring proof of a “sufficient causal link between the assurance relied on and the detriment asserted”: see Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 at 232E-F. In practice, this amounts to the “but for” test (i.e. but for the promise would the claimant have acted in the way that is said to have given rise to the detriment): see Snell’s Equity (34^th Ed.) (at 12-043) and The Law of Proprietary Estoppel (2^nd Ed.) by Ben Macfarlane (at 3.112-3.113 and 3.174-3.187).

14              As to detriment, this must result directly from the reasonable reliance: see Thorner v Major at [29]. It must also be detriment suffered by the claimant directly. Detriment suffered by parties related to him is not relevant: see The Law of Proprietary Estoppel (2^nd Ed.) by Ben Macfarlane (at 4.107 to 4.112).

15              Detriment is “not a narrow or technical concept. The detriment need not consist of the expenditure of money or other quantifiable financial detriment, so long as it is something substantial”: see Gillett v Holt at 232D-E. In testing detriment, the court does not undertake an exercise in forensic accounting but must “stand back and look at the matter in the round”: see Gillett v Holt at 233H.

16              In assessing whether the requirement of substantial detriment has been met, the court must take into account any countervailing benefits acquired by the claimant as a result of his reliance: see Snell’s Equity (34^th Ed.) (at 12-044). This requires the court to weigh the disadvantages suffered by the claimant against any countervailing advantages: see Henry v Henry [2010] 1 All ER 988 at [53].

‘Skeleton Arguments for interim applications should not exceed 15 pages’: –

The updated version of the Chancery Guide specifies that Skeleton arguments for interim hearings should not normally exceed 15 pages. Paragraph 6.57 states:

‘Skeleton arguments should be no longer than is necessary. They should normally not exceed 15 pages. Even in the heaviest cases they should not exceed 25 pages (including any appendices and schedules). Should a party wish to file a longer skeleton argument, the senior legal representative whose name appears at the end of the skeleton argument must file a letter along with the skeleton argument explaining why this has been necessary. A desire to be of greater assistance to the court is rarely a good reason: overly long skeletons do not assist. If the Master or HCJ is not satisfied by the explanation the party may be required to re-draft the skeleton argument and/or costs sanctions may be imposed. For further guidance on skeleton arguments generally see Appendix Y.’

Note also that para 14.43 states:

‘Skeleton arguments for ordinary applications should be no longer than is necessary. They should not exceed 15 pages (including any appendices and schedules) and should be skeletons, not full written arguments. Should it exceptionally be considered necessary to file a longer skeleton argument, the legal representatives whose names appear at the end of the skeleton argument must file a letter along with the skeleton argument explaining why this has been necessary. A desire to be of greater assistance to the court is rarely a good reason: overly long skeletons do not assist. If the Master or HCJ is not satisfied by the explanation, the party may be required to re-draft the skeleton argument and/or costs sanctions may be imposed. For further guidance on skeleton arguments generally, see Appendix Y.’

Paragraph 12.51 further states that Trial Skeleton Arguments, should not normally exceed 25 pages. ‘Even in the heaviest cases they should not exceed 50 pages in length, including appendices and schedules (minimum font size of 12 point and 1.5 line spacing).’

In paragraph 5.26.1 (Legal argument and reasoning), of my forthcoming book, the 2nd Edition of the Contentious Probate Handbook, which is scheduled for publication by the Law Society in mid to late February 2025, I write:

‘As the late and great Mr Justice Hunt remarked in a lecture to the South Eastern Circuit Bar Mess entitled, ‘The Art of Advocacy’:

Do not embark on your case like Christopher Columbus, who on his voyage of discovery, did not know:

(i)      where he was going;
(ii)     when he arrived, where he was; and
(i)      after he had been there, where he had been!

Know where you are going, and when you have got there sit down.

Set out what you want in paragraph 1 of your skeleton argument, “the Claimant’s case is …” Set out your stall, what you are asking for and want the judge to do.

Say to yourself – “what am I doing here? What is my case?”

Your opening is the route-map for your case containing the clearest sign-posts to point the judge in the right direction.

Thus, the first Golden rule of advocacy is that before starting out know where you are going, how you are going to get there, and what you need to say and prove, so that the Judge will follow you to your planned destination!’

Your Skeleton Argument is the route-map for winning your application/case at trial. So do not turn it into a travel almanac! The judge is not going on holiday to Italy. What he needs is a succinct summary of what you are asking him to order, and of why he should grant the directions/remedies you seek. Thus in written advocacy, less is more. In other words, the acme of persuasion is brevity.

Today my editor at the Law Society approved the inclusion in the book of a 50 page section about Mediation Advocacy.

As far as I am aware, this will become the first comprehensive published literature anywhere in the world, on the subject of Mediation Advocacy in Trust and Estate Disputes.

This section is based upon the webinar I presented at 4pm GMT on Thursday 24 October 2024, to members of the SCMA worldwide.

My next book is entitled, ‘Dealing With Conflict Constructively’, and I am planning to start work on the book on 1st March 2025.

This will be written as both a course textbook for law undergraduates, and as a handbook about dispute resolution negotiation for legal practitioners.

See the ‘My next book’ page at www.carlislam.co.uk.

This will be supported by material that I will post on my new YouTube Channel, see the ‘My YouTube Channel’ page of my website and the link to the recording of my recent talk about Mediation Advocacy on that page.

During the Institute of Art & Law Training Day today I had the opportunity to speak to a leading UK Law Professor who confirmed that ‘Negotiation’ theory & practice is not taught to Law undergraduates in the UK. In her University, she runs two modules about negotiation for postgraduates. She is from Canada, where apparently ‘negotiation’ forms an integral part of a law undergraduate’s formal education. When she came here she was shocked to find what I have been saying for months on LinkedIn, i.e. that ‘Dispute Resolution Negotiation Theory & Practice’, including ‘Mediation Advocacy’ is not taught to law undergraduates in the UK.

What I also discovered today is the enormous space that exists for specialised training to be provided about the ‘Mediation of Art Disputes’ and ‘Mediation Advocacy’ in these disputes. As far as I am aware nobody is providing this niche training to mediators and mediation advocates. So, there is a huge gap in the market for these courses.

I also had the opportunity to ask a speaker about how in the mediation of a ‘misattribution’ claim, the true value of the disputed artwork can be determined to the satisfaction of the art market, i.e. because the underlying methodology for arriving at and agreeing upon the value is unknown to the market. One speaker acknowledged the problem. Another opined this was not a problem in the primary art market. Mediation is popular in these disputes, as discussed by Anne Laure Bandle in her leading textbook for Art Law practitioners – ‘The Sale of Misattributed Artworks And Antiques At Auction.’ I wonder if the solution is a hybrid process of expert determination and mediation?

An original idea also occurred to me during another excellent talk given by Lauren Gowler. It is this – ‘Can crowdfunding be used to raise funds for mediation in a campaign for the repatriation of ancient art, i.e. Mediation Crowd Funding?’

Is there a precedent?

I recently read ‘Negotiation – Things Corporate Counsel Need to Know but Were Not Taught’, by Michael Leathes. He posits that mediation can be used to facilitate the negotiation of contracts. I vividly recall when this would have been helpful in overcoming deadlock in the negotiation of a power project contract about how sensibly the risk of a latent defect could be shouldered. In my article – ‘Back to the future’ – Part 2 – Mediation and Estate/Business Succession Planning. Taxation (Tolley) I also argued for mediation in lifetime planning. So, I asked a speaker whether mediation is used in the US to facilitate expansion of the commercial pie during the negotiation of artist contracts. It isn’t.

You know when speakers are good because the day passes fast. 7 hours today went by in a flash. So, my personal thanks as a delegate to IAL’s and to all of the speakers for their excellent presentations and for allowing me to pose so many questions!

Proprietary Estoppel & Constructive Trust claims are not Contentious Probate claims. These claims are discussed in detail in my book, the ‘Contentious Trusts Handbook’, published by the Law Society in 2020.

A ‘Proprietary estoppel’ claim typically consists of asserting an equitable claim against the conscience of the ‘true’ owner. The claim is a ‘mere equity’. It must be satisfied by the minimum award necessary to do justice, which may sometimes lead to no more than a monetary award.

By contrast, a ‘common intention’ constructive trust claim, involves identifying the true beneficial owner or owners, and the size of their beneficial interests.

English law provides no clear and all-embracing theory of constructive trusts.

The boundaries have been left perhaps deliberately vague so as not to restrict the Court by technicalities in deciding what the justice of a particular case might demand.

There are established categories of circumstances in which it has been held that a constructive trust will arise. The categories are not closed. The categories include constructive trusts arising from:

(i)      impugned transactions/payments (without a prior fiduciary relationship);
(ii)     a prior fiduciary relationship; and
(iii)    a prior agreement or understanding.

The constructive trust is not a rigid doctrine. Instead it is deliberately built on a flexible, high level principle of ‘good conscience’.

The current orthodoxy in English law for constructive trusts is whether a proprietary interest exists is not dependent on property per se, but rather when:

(a)  it is unconscionable to deny the beneficial interest of another; or
(b) if there is fraud.

For a ‘common intention’ constructive trust to arise, the parties must have had a ‘common intention’ to share the property beneficially, upon the faith of which the claimant then acts in reliance to his/her detriment.

It is the ‘detrimental reliance’ that makes it ‘unconscionable’ for the defendant landowner to resile from their otherwise unenforceable agreement.

The court has no power to impute an ‘agreement’ or ‘common intention’ to the parties based upon what it considers would have been fair or reasonable.

When the court is considering what the parties actually intended, it looks at the objective phenomena available for consideration, and not into their minds themselves.

The assessment is thus an objective rather than a subjective one.

Pleading these claims in association with a Contentious Probate claim is often a sign of desperation. That is because these cases are highly fact-sensitive, and most fail at trial. Thus, they are perceived to be ‘high costs’ claims of last resort which are pregnant with litigation risk. That is why during the first CMC in such cases, a judge is likely to order a stay for ADR, i.e. Mediation without consent.

The following is an extract from my forthcoming article – ‘Mediation Advocacy in Trust & Estate Disputes – Part 1: Preparation’, (which I will complete and offer for publication in March 2025):

‘By entering into negotiation, parties in dispute may be able to capitalise on their different needs and priorities in order to discover agreements which expand the estate pie, i.e. by uncovering value-creating trades. Therefore, on one level, resolving an estate dispute through the process of facilitated negotiation/mediated dialogue, involves a ‘distributive’ negotiation about a finite resource, i.e. division of the estate assets, and focuses on each party’s individual interests and needs. On another level, it involves an ‘integrative’ negotiation which aims to create mutual gains and find solutions that meet the needs of each party in dispute [‘P’], by considering their common interests. However, there is a tension between ‘distributive’ and ‘integrative’ negotiation, because how can e.g. P.1 seek to create value without exposing himself to the risk of exploitation by P.2 in the distributive aspects of the negotiation? Resolving the dilemma requires creative joint-problem solving by all involved in the process.

In Mediation, the possibilities are only limited by the imagination of the participants and their Mediation Advocates. Whilst not infinite, in my experience, ‘doable’ deals that ‘are enough’ are invariably possible.

In the words of the Rolling Stones,
“You can’t always get what you want
 But if you try sometimes, well, you just might find
 You get what you need.”

In the first part of this article, the author provides a set of ideas about how best to prepare as a negotiator, for the settlement of a trust/estate dispute in mediation.’

At 4pm GMT on Thursday 24 October 2024, I presented an online talk to members of the SCMA worldwide, about ‘Mediation Advocacy in Trust & Estate Disputes.’ Click on this link and ‘de-mute’ to watch and listen to the video of my talk on YouTube: https://lnkd.in/ea6D6XnC

YouTube: 

The following is a paragraph I wrote this morning for my next article – ‘Mediation Advocacy in Trust & Estate Disputes – Part 1: Preparation.’ I am planning to complete the article and submit it to Trusts & Trustees (Oxford University Press) in March 2025. I will then write Part 2 – ‘Negotiation’, later in 2025. The extract from Part 1 is as follows:

‘In a trust/estate dispute value can be squandered because it is never identified. The opportunity for a mutually satisfactory trade exists in what the author calls the ‘Deal-Making Matrix’ (‘DMM’). The DMM is a mind-map (that can be sketched on a whiteboard), which graphically illustrates the dynamic interrelationship between what is of vital commercial interest to each P.

Thereby, what is of lesser strategic importance to each becomes apparent. Where e.g. each P attaches asymmetrical values to the same trust/estate assets, therein lies a potential trade. However, a potential trade cannot be forensically analysed and plotted with any accuracy before a mediated dialogue has commenced. That is because P.1’s pre-mediation analysis of the price he is willing to pay to do a deal can only be based upon untested assumptions about what P.2 is willing to accept.

So, during that early ‘preparation’ stage of the process, P’s calculation of the ‘price’ can only be provisional (i.e. a starting-point), as adjustments will need to be made during the mediated dialogue if it becomes apparent that P.1’s assumptions are erroneous. Thus, P.1 will need to re-calculate the price of doing a deal throughout the process as new information and insights emerge, and likewise, so will P.2.’

See also the Video on YouTube of my online talk to members of the Standing Conference of Mediation Advocates worldwide – ‘Mediation Advocacy in Trust and Estate Disputes’ (24.11.2024): https://lnkd.in/e787e7uF

The recording is now available to view on the ‘My YouTube Channel’ page at www.carlislam.co.uk. Please scroll back to the beginning to see it from the start. The talk is introduced by Andrew Goodman, who is a globally recognised guru and legend in the Mediation Advocacy community.

In 2025, I am planning to launch a new YouTube Channel – ‘Art of Agreement – How to deal with our differences constructively.’

The niche is how to negotiate conflict/dispute settlement.

The target audience is students, academics, and practitioners of negotiation and mediation advocacy (many of whom also practice as mediators) – globally.

Before the launch I will upload this recording as the first hour of content along with new video content that is planned but has not yet been recorded.

Direct link – https://youtu.be/W6_PnTH98b4