Validity is resolved by determination of the proper, i.e. governing law. There is little case law on the choice of law rules for trusts. Determination of the proper law of a trust is an undeveloped subject. The Hague Convention on the Recognition of Trusts simplified the issue. However, there is residual uncertainty about common law rules. The modern view is that the proper law of the trust is the law chosen by the settlor, as expressed or implied in the terms of the trust. Where there is no express choice, the emerging doctrine is that the trust is governed by the law with which it is ‘most closely connected’.
Uncertainty may also surround the question of which particular aspects of a trust the term ‘proper law of the trust’ applies to. For the purposes of determining the choice of law, several distinct trust issues require consideration:
(i)          whether the trust instrument is valid according to the appropriately chosen law;
(ii)        whether the trust itself is valid;
(iii)       the validity of the transfer of the assets;
(iv)       the capacity of the settlor to create a trust; and
(v)        the administration, construction, variation and interpretation of the trust.

The question of the proper law of an offshore trust remains even in the face of an express choice of law clause. Therefore, the validity and effectiveness of a clause drafted in the 1970s, may now become contentious. It is also open to the English court to hold that the choice of offshore law offends public policy because of its hybrid and more flexible trust law features. While the general rule is to give effect to an express choice of law based upon the analogical premise of the ‘freedom to contract’, there are reservations, because it is logical to expect that such limitations for trusts will be on similar principles to those for contracts. On the conflict of law rules governing contracts, limitations are based upon the choice being:
(i)         bona fide;

(ii) legal;
(iii) not contrary to public policy;
(iv)       connected with the contract; and
(v)        meaningful.

Therefore, an offshore trust set up 50 years ago on the cheap, on standard instead of legally robust ‘bespoke’ terms, is potentially a sitting duck for a revenue authority, i.e. if the validity and applicable law of the trust can be challenged as a result of inadequate drafting. This potential line of attack is also connected to unlawful tax avoidance and tax fraud, which I will discuss in my next article for ‘Taxation’ (Tolley), which I am planning to write in 2023 entitled, ‘What is the jurisdiction of the English court where breach of fiduciary duty by a non-resident trustee amounts to unlawful tax avoidance or fraud?’

See also:

The taxation of trusts: a review – summary of responses (publishing.service.gov.uk)

Bermuda’s firewall legislation and its recent trust law reforms. | Carey Olsen

The FTT is not bound by the traditional mantra of statutory and common law principles of admissibility. As a general rule, all evidence is admissible, whether or not it would ordinarily be admissible in a civil court. However, overriding common law principles, e.g. protection of legal professional privilege are not curtailed by FTT r.15(2)(a) because the FT must act within the framework of the Human Rights Act. The same applies in the UT.

A Tax Appeal will often involve questions of evidence, e.g.
(i)         whether a taxpayer was carrying on a trade;
(ii)        the nature of a transaction;
(iii)       valuation of goods and services;
(iv)       whether a non-incorporated UK company was centrally managed and controlled in the UK by its directors and/or shareholders; and
(v)        whether the accounting treatment for an item of expenditure is correct.
FTT Rule 15(2) states:
‘(2) The Tribunal may— (a) admit evidence whether or not the evidence would be admissible in a civil trial in the United Kingdom; or (b) exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible where— (i) the evidence was not provided within the time allowed by a direction or a practice direction; (ii) the evidence was otherwise provided in a manner that did not comply with a direction or a practice direction; or (iii) it would otherwise be unfair to admit the evidence.’
The legal test of admissibility is ‘relevance’, and there is a presumption that all relevant evidence should be admitted unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary, Mobile Export 365 Ltd v. Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2007] and Atlantic Electronic v. Revenue and Customs Comrs [2013].
Application of r.15(2) is the subject of guidance in HMRC v. IAC Associates [2013]. Nugee J observed, ‘… one starts with asking the question whether the evidence is admissible. It is admissible if it is relevant. It is relevant if it is potentially probative of one of the issues in the case. One then asks, notwithstanding that it is admissible evidence, whether [there] are good reasons why the court (or tribunal in this case) should nevertheless direct that it be excluded.’
In Revenue and Customs Comrs v. Atlantic Electronics Ltd [2013], one of the issues before the Court of Appeal was whether the admission of the material by the Upper Tribunal was just, fair and proportionate. Ryder LJ (with whom Arden LJ agreed) stated that:
‘HMRC wish to have [a certificate of conviction and the indictment and a note of the prosecution opening] admitted so that they can explain to the FTT the detailed background rather than merely the technical relevance of the convictions to their case. … The UT adopted the correct approach to the admission of the materials in question. It assessed whether the evidence is relevant and applied the presumption that all relevant evidence should be admitted unless there is a compelling reason to the contrary. … The prejudice to the Revenue in not being able to rely on the note of the prosecution opening is clear once the purpose of the admission of the material is analysed i.e. the dishonest and knowing participation of [X] as a contra trader.’ The UT was therefore entitled to decide to admit the disputed evidence.

This is discussed in my evolving essay ‘Art Restitution Litigation in the English Court’ on the ‘Mediation of Art & Cultural Heritage Disputes’ page at www.carlislam.co.uk.

A novel legal theory occurred to me over the weekend when I started to write the essay, which runs as follows.

If P delivers the SA to a dealer [‘D‘] in London for sale, and under their contract D acquired a proprietary interest in the SA, then under the Limitation Act 1980 [‘LA’], could possession of the SA by D constitute a conversion ‘related to the theft’ of the SA which took place in England?

Under the LA, ‘Once … A bona fide purchaser acquired the chattel, and six years has run from the date of his acquisition, the owner cannot sue a person who acquires the chattel after the date of the bona fide purchaser’s acquisition, even if he is not himself a bona fide purchaser … Any conversion which follows the theft before the owner recovers possession is treated as “related to the theft” except a purchase in good faith or any acquisition subject to such a purchase; section 4(2).’ Arden J in De Preval v. Adrian Alan Ltd [1997]. ‘It does seem to be possible to identify, from that legislation, a public policy in England that time is not to run either in favour of the thief nor in favour of any transferee who is not a purchaser in good faith. The law favours the true owner of property which has been stolen, however long the period which has elapsed since the original theft.’ The City of Gotha [1998].

It therefore appears, that unless D can rebut the presumption under s.4(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 that the purchase by P was related to the theft, i.e. by proving that under English Law P had purchased the SA in good faith (for which purpose the court may take into account the factors mentioned by the judge in De Preval) , then the carve-out provided for in s.4(2) (i.e. that ‘if anyone purchases the stolen chattel in good faith neither the purchase nor any conversion following it shall be regarded as related to the theft’) is not engaged.

In other words, unless D can prove that P acquired the stolen painting in good faith in the foreign country where he purchased it, which arguably is a question to be decided by applying English Law to determine ‘good faith’, that D will fail at trial to discharge the burden of proof under s.4(2) of the Limitation Act 1980.

In which case, the first good faith purchase following the theft of the SA in England, took place when the painting was delivered by P into D’s possession in London.

Therefore, if this occurred less than six years ago, time is running under the Limitation Act for the bringing of a claim in conversion against D (who is in possession of the SA in London). 

US law protects the interests of the original owner of art unlike any other system of law. In the case law and statutes of many US jurisdictions, three main approaches to the question of the running of time under limitation legislation may be discerned:
(i)           an ‘actual discovery’ rule (as provided for in California);
(ii)          the ‘demand and refusal’ rule (applied by the New York courts); and
(iii)         the ‘discovery or due diligence’ rule (in most other jurisdictions).
In international property law, which governs the question of the law applicable to in rem relations, the principle of lex rei sitae, is widely recognised. According to this principle, the validity of the transfer of the tangible movable and its effect on the proprietary rights of the parties thereto and those claiming under them in respect thereof, are governed by the law of the country where the movable is at the time of the transfer (lex situs).
If the object is moved from one jurisdiction to another, this leads to a change in jurisdiction with regard to property law, with the consequence that the law of the new situs of the object is decisive concerning existing rights of possession and ownership, as well as other in rem rights. #litigation#art#law In accordance with the situs rule, the law of the new situs, also decides whether, under what conditions and with what effect rights in stolen property can be acquired.
There has been a noticeable change in US conflict laws as applied in cases over the past 15 years, signalling a gradual departure from the perceived stricture of the situs rule and toward a more flexible approach, that of the ’most significant relationship’ test.
When confronted with the possibility of a transfer under civil law, US courts have shown noticeable reluctance to apply foreign law to cases concerning stolen property.
In two cases, the landmark Menzel v. List and the De Weerth saga, the question of the transfer under foreign law was not even raised, facilitating the application of US law and ignoring the fact that both paintings had gone through Parisian galleries and had been kept there for some time prior to their subsequent transfer in New York.
In two other cases, Elicofon and Goldberg a potential transfer of title under civil law had been discussed, yet in both cases the courts in the end chose to apply the ‘most significant relationship’ test instead of the lex situs rule, thus enabling them to apply local state laws in both cases.

I briefly discuss the primary advantage of Mediation over litigation in relation to these disputes in a wider article I am writing for Trusts & Trustees (OUP) – ‘Mediating Probate Trust & Tax Disputes –Challenges & Tools’, which I am on schedule to complete in August. The following is an extract:
‘Where terms of an Islamic family trust were drafted following consultation with Sharia Scholars who pronounced upon conformity with Islamic law, and the deed contains a valid and applicable English governing law clause (‘GLC’), the GLC Engages:
(i)         An ocean on potentially applicable equitable principles developed under English Law, except to the extent that any right, duty or power has been modified or lawfully excluded under the express terms of the trust, as drafted.
(ii)        Fiduciary principles under Islamic law.
Depending upon the knowledge and skill of the draftsman, this may have resulted in the creation of a lacunae between:
(a)        an applicable principle of equity under English law; and
(b)        an unstated ethical principle under Islamic law.
Islamic Law is not a unified system of law. Furthermore, the doctrinal foundations of fiduciary theory in Islamic law suffer from a paucity of analysis. As Professor Mohammad Fadel concludes in chapter 28 of the Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law (2019) (‘Fiduciary principles in classical Islamic law systems’), at page 543:
‘[There is] a vast body of rules in classical Islamic law that were reflective of fiduciary principles. … [An] Islamic fiduciary, above all, is supposed to be motivated by a genuine sense of moral duty and is always aware that his or her discharge of that duty is subject to divine supervision. If fiduciary duties arise as a solution to incomplete contracting, it is a unique kind of contract insofar as the fiduciary is prevented from securing his own interests. It is rather an undertaking to do one’s best in furtherance of the interests of another. This altruistic dimension of fiduciary duties in Islamic law is ultimately its most crucial feature, distinguishing it from other legal relationships.’
 
Therefore if the family trust dispute proceeds to litigation, a court which has jurisdiction, becomes in effect a final arbiter of the meaning and enforcement of the rights of the beneficiaries, and the duties and powers of the trustee (and of any Protector) under the terms of the Islamic Trust deed. The court will make its decision based upon the expert evidence presented about Islamic Law. Since its decision is likely to depend upon the eminence of the expert whose evidence the court prefers, the outcome of the litigation:
(i)         is uncertain; and
(ii)        may not conform with the Islamic ethics of the deceased settlor [‘S’].
Through Mediation, the participants can instead discuss and explore S’s ethics, and agree bespoke ‘ethical’ terms of settlement in a form which a court has no power to impose under English Law.’

‘Mediation of Probate Trust & Tax Disputes – Challenges & Tools’ – This is the title of an article I am currently writing which I am aiming to submit to Trusts & Trustees (OUP) in August, for publication later this year.
Introduction – ‘In essence, mediation is a forward-looking conversation. The role of a mediator (‘M’) is to manage the process and ensure that it is conducted in accordance with the terms of the Mediation Agreement. M must also:
·       create an environment in which adversarial parties in a confrontational dispute can come out of their ‘positional’ trenches and walk towards the centre of the commercial problem that divides them; and
·       empower adversarial parties to a dispute to become participants [‘P‘s’] in a creative, bespoke and collaborative problem-solving exercise, and eventually, to walk side by side in jointly exploring and developing a commercial solution of their own design which takes into account: the facts presented in their respective position statements and agreed bundle of documents; legal merits; litigation risks; the time value of money; and the benefits (including tax benefits) of ‘doing a deal’ now, instead of incurring further legal costs by resuming trench warfare and going to trial.
This requires counter-intuitive thinking and behaviour and can result in a ‘paradigm shift’ which results in a creative solution that a court cannot impose. It therefore also requires a ‘commercial’ rather than a ‘forensic’ legal or procedural mind-set, and some imagination. The challenge for a mediator is to persuade each participant to identify (in strict confidence) what is actually at stake, i.e. to drill down to what a participant’s objectives, needs and priorities are, and why.
While it is not the function of M to speak truth to power, M can facilitate the re-framing of a dispute as an opportunity, by enabling each P think about what is important to them, so that the P‘s can agree upon a ‘methodology’ i.e. a ‘road map’ for convergence and consensus. This requires a ‘paradigm shift’, i.e. acceptance by each P that there is a better way of resolving their dispute than going to trial. The tools that M can use to engineer a sudden outbreak of common sense are the subject of this article. If you have any ideas or comments about mediation that you would like to contribute please email carl@ihtbar.com.

Two recent cases illustrate where evidentially: (i) breach of fiduciary duty; (ii) unlawful tax avoidance; and (iii) fraud, can all potentially intersect in a trust or probate dispute. Therefore, a breach of fiduciary duty claim against a non-resident trustee can trigger a tax investigation in the UK. See:

(a)        Van Zuylen v Whiston-Dew & Anor [2021] – see my blog, ‘Investment Fund Fraud – Jurisdiction of English court’ (Google ‘Carl’s Wealth Planning blog’ and use the search box to find). Judge Nicholas Thompsell stated:– ‘[The Defendant argued] that this court had no jurisdiction as the matters in question fell to be determined by the courts of St Kitts and Nevis under the terms applicable to the [2nd] Trust. … [The] point was utterly without merit given that the Claimant has not made any claim for breach of the [2nd] Trust and has never bound herself to any foreign jurisdiction. Her principal complaints against the Defendant were based on his deceit, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract and breach of the general prohibition under the FSMA. In addition, I have found that the [2nd] Trust, was used by the Defendant as an instrument of deceit and as such it should be ignored. … In El Anjou, the claimant was the victim of a fraudulent share-selling scheme … The fraudulent scheme involved the transfer of money through various jurisdictions and ultimately into a London-based property development project.
(b)        Reeves v Drew [2022], a contentious probate claim in which: (i) the Claimant’s counsel sought to prove that one of the witnesses [‘W’] (an accountant) was a ‘crook by reference to a [property] transaction [where] the purchase price was misstated in order to effect a tax fraud [and submitted that W] was a crook and his evidence should not therefore be believed [which was allowed] (para 108); and (ii) Judge Michael Green stated, ‘it may necessarily follow that a finding that the deceased did not know and approve the contents carried with it the strong implication that she engineered an extraordinary fraud … it is not necessary for the defendants to prove that this was what happened and that it was fraudulent or dishonest. … The way that the [solicitor] went about the preparation of the will was … quite possibly dishonest. … There could be serious consequences for [the solicitor] as a result of my findings. But it would not be right for me to speculate on this, particularly as the defendants do not allege and do not seek to prove that there was a fraud …’ [paras 344,347,348, 407 & 408].

There is no statutory definition of the role of a trust Protector [‘P’]. What P’s role is called is much less important than the powers the trust deed confers on the Protector. P can be given the right to settle disputes between the trustee and the beneficiaries. Therefore, P can e.g. mediate between two different classes of beneficiaries such as income and residuary beneficiaries in the event of a dispute or disagreement. P can also be set up as the ‘decision-maker’ rather than a mediator. 

The HMRC internal Trusts Settlements and Estates Manual states – TSEM10050 – Non-resident trusts: residence rules: professional trustees not resident in the UK – introduction and background states, ‘The rules that came into force on 6 April 2007 treat the trustees of a settlement as a single person, as distinct from the persons who may be trustees from time to time. The residence status of that single person (referred to below as the “body of trustees”) at any given time is determined in the first instance by the residence status of the persons who are trustees at that time:
·        If all the trustees are either resident in the UK or not resident in the UK, the residence status of the body of trustees follows that outcome.
·        If at any time at least one trustee is resident in the UK and at least one is not, the body of trustees is resident in the UK only if any settlor of the trust was resident, ordinarily resident or domiciled in the UK at any time when he or she introduced property into the trust.’

Therefore, could an offshore trust be treated as being resident in the UK for both income tax and CGT, where by virtue of the powers conferred on P under the terms of the trust, P is a ‘de facto’ trustee, and is resident in the UK, i.e. because P is a decision maker?

What concerns me, is whether a judge may one day conclude that where P behaves like a mediator, that even though mediators do not make decisions for parties in dispute, that by becoming actively involved in the dispute resolution process, P has stepped out of his conventional role as a Protector, and stepped into a role which has as its objective the making of a decision about the administration of the trust. In which case depending upon what P says and does, the boundary between P being either a decision maker or a mediator is blurred.

As Lewin on Trusts states in paragraphs 28-045 & 28-047 “A protector … is typically the holder of a group of powers or requirements of consent. The word is not a term of art … If the protector holds an office under the trust, it will ordinarily be impossible to construe the power or powers as beneficial: the protector will be there for the protection of the beneficiaries and his powers will be fiduciary. … The scope of the protector’s functions depends on the provisions, express and implied, of the trust instrument.”

While protection may involve advising mediation, it does not require a protector to be a mediator, and in sharp contrast to a mediator, P owes fiduciary duties toward beneficiaries in dispute who participate in mediation.

As far as I am aware, few trust administration professionals, i.e. TEP’s, have trained and become accredited as mediators. I have, and think there is a risk that if P is not a trained and accredited mediator, that he/she is not likely to know what they are doing. In which case if the court finds that P has crossed the line and become a decision maker (i.e. by in effect imposing a decision on the beneficiaries and/or trustees), then HMRC can conclude that the trust is UK resident i.e. if P is resident in the UK and the other connecting factors exist, because P has behaved as a de facto trustee. This is purely musing on my part. However, if I am right, this could bring billions into the UK tax net, which I think politically, would be popular.

‘[Even] trusts with powers exercised through a protector may be challenged as shams, particularly where they are exercised for the personal benefit of the settlors. … [With] respect to the taxation of offshore trusts by onshore jurisdictions – If the protector’s power is such that the trust is deemed to be managed and controlled by the protector and not the trustee, it is the protector’s residence that will determine the trust residence for purposes of taxation. This would jeopardize the trust where the protector is a resident of the onshore jurisdiction.’ Trusts and Related Tax Issues in Offshore Financial Law (2005), OUP, by Dr Rose-Marie Antoine. If the trust is challenged in litigation as being either a sham or an onshore trust, what planning rationale can a defendant provide to the court to explain why the settlor [‘S’] went to such lengths to give powers to a protector which S could legitimately have reserved to himself or herself, provided that S did not retain control over the trust?

If the reason for appointing P is that S decided to err on the side of caution and not tempt the court into finding that the trust was a sham, but that insufficient thought was given to the powers conferred on P and the tax residence of P, then while the court may find that the trust is not a sham, or an illusory trust, it could find that the trust is resident for income tax and CGT in the UK, provided all the connecting factors I have previously mentioned existed when S constituted the trust with cash or an asset, e.g. a luxury yacht or art collection.

Therefore, it is unwise for a Protector of an Offshore Trust to become involved in the mediation of an internal trust dispute.

I have been commissioned by Trusts & Trustees (Oxford University Press), to write an in-depth article about the ‘Mediation of International Trust Disputes’ which I am planning to write in July/August.

In the article I will also discuss:

(i) Common challenges to offshore trusts.

(ii) Connecting factors for tax.

(iii) The framework of applicable conflict of laws principles in litigation.

(iv) The opportunity that mediation presents to re-draft a trust deed that is no longer fit for purpose – which is a time-bomb waiting to go off when, e.g. the patriarchs of wealthy families in the gulf either lose capacity or die, and a succession battle results in litigation.

(v) The application of these issues to the mediation of disputes involving Islamic Finance, wealth planning, and family trusts.

If there are any particular issues you would like me to discuss, please send an email to carl@ihtbar.com.

Likewise, if you would like to receive PDF copies of my recent articles published in Taxation (Tolley) about the mediation of probate disputes, and the use of mediation as an estate and business succession planning process to enable an international family to put their house in order before a monumental event occurs.

‘Expert Mediation’ of Tax disputes? – Paragraph 16 of the HMRC Litigation and Settlement Strategy (the ‘LSS’) states, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), and more specifically facilitation or mediation, is a flexible dispute resolution tool available to HMRC which, in appropriate cases, can help HMRC and its customers resolve disputes (or reach key decision points) in a cost effective and efficient manner. The LSS applies to the resolution of all disputes through civil procedures. Therefore, any resolution of a dispute between HMRC and a customer, whether it’s resolution involved ADR or not, must accord with the terms of the LSS and specifically be a resolution which HMRC considers could reasonably be reached by a tribunal.’ While in principle any tax dispute may be resolved by either agreement or litigation, on its face, the LSS will not permit HRMC officers ‘to do deals.’ However, as Keith Gordon observes in paragraph 2.2.2 of the 5th edition of ‘Tax Appeals – Law and Practice at the FTT’ (2022), ‘In practice, deals can still be done, although it is usually necessary to show that the ultimate result can be reconciled with a possible outcome from the litigation (even if the justification for the outcome is not particularly logical).’ This is a question of mathematics. I.E if ‘A’ and ‘B’ are in dispute and A = 5 and B = 10, while a settlement for 7.5 is not possible (because that would be splitting the difference) a settlement for either 5 or 10, plus a proportion of costs would appear to be possible. What the Mediator needs to understand, is that the extent of flexibility depends upon the attitude of the officer and his/her willingness to reach an amicable settlement. In other words, these constraints are an opportunity for creative structuring of terms of settlement. Where there is a range of possible figures for tax due, HMRC will not settle by agreement for an amount which is less than it would reasonably expect to obtain from litigation, (the LSS paragraph 17). Therefore, the key to settlement is understanding the basis of that expectation. This is where an expert can assist the mediator and parties – see ‘Expert Mediation’ on the Mediation of ‘Probate & Trust Disputes’ page at www.ihtbar.com. Taking into account the decision in Wired Orthodontics Ltd v HMRC [2020] UKFTT 290 (TC), is it possible and practical to agree upon the appointment of an independent single-joint expert for the purposes of both Mediation and Litigation, i.e. provided the expert remains bound by mediation confidentiality following the Mediation?
I have been commissioned by Taxation (Tolley) to write an article in 2023 about the ‘Mediation of Tax Disputes’ and would be interested in hearing the views of tax partitioners about the Mediation of Tax Disputes. My contact details are set out on the ‘Consultation’ page at www.ihtbar.com.

‘In order to try to obtain further insights into the challenges that mediators encounter when working with parties and their advisers, we asked about the frequency with which they encountered particular behaviours within client negotiation teams. … This year, the need for more thorough preparation was far and away the most common piece of advice offered. In addition, a number of respondents highlighted the importance of remembering that negotiation in mediation is a process of persuasion. One mediator recommended parties to “think about what you can say or do that will help the other party walk towards you” whilst another made essentially the same point more colourfully: “You are trying to persuade the other side to say yes, not batter them down. No one likes to agree with someone who is punching them in the face. Therefore, you need to think beforehand and during the mediation about how you are going to encourage the other side to say yes and think from their perspective as to what they need, not yours”.’ See: CEDR 9TH Mediation Audit (2021): https://lnkd.in/ewu_s4mv

Mediation works best, where instead of rehearsing their case, participants invest in the process by preparing ‘to do a deal’ instead of going to war by developing a ‘settlement strategy’. Therefore, sufficiently in advance of the mediation, each participant needs to think about:
● The potential settlement zone.
● The known or estimated gap between what each participant wants.
● Their ‘BATNA’ (best alternative to a negotiated agreement, i.e. going to trial).
● How to close the gap and come away with a win/win solution compared to the costs and risks of litigation and proceeding to trial.

A good Mediation Strategy has realistic objectives. Therefore, where a party’s evaluation of merits and quantum is clouded by optimism, anchoring, sunken costs bias, and an attachment to specific e.g. luxury/sentimental estate assets, then specialist mediation counsel (who may be more detached than a party’s solicitor), can add value by educating the party about the merits of their claim/defence, realistic chances of success and the litigation risks. This may result in a critical evaluation of beliefs and expectations. If both parties undertake this exercise early on in their dispute, this increases the opportunities for settlement.

This will be discussed in my next article, for Trusts & Trustees (Oxford University Press) about the ‘Mediation of Probate and Trust Disputes’ which I am aiming to complete and submit in July, for publication later this year.