In court this may require expert evidence. It is not a matter of taste. It is a matter of aesthetic judgment. At common law English Judges have accorded ‘art’ with a wide and liberal meaning. In Haunch of Venison Partners Ltd v. Her Majesty’s Commissioners of Revenue and Customs [2008] the Tribunal judges noted that while the American case of Brancusi v. United States (cited by the Appellant’s counsel) was not an authority binding on the Tax Tribunal, that the court in that case acknowledged the relevance of expert evidence about whether the creator of the artwork in dispute was a professional sculptor, ‘as is shown by his reputation and works in the manner in which he is considered by those competent to judge upon that subject.‘ The essential questions debated before the court in Brancusi concerned the criteria for determining what was a work of art? Who was an artist? And who was to judge these questions? The judge held, ‘[There] has been developing a so-called new school of art whose exponents attempt to portray abstract ideas rather than to imitate natural objects. Whether or not we are in sympathy with these new ideas and the schools which represent them, we think the fact of their existence and their influence upon the art world as recognized by the courts must be considered. The object now under consideration is shown to be for purely ornamental purposes, its use being the same as that of any piece of sculpture of the old Masters. It is beautiful and symmetrical in outline, and while some difficulty might be encountered in associating it with a bird, it is nevertheless pleasing to look at and highly ornamental. And as we hold under the evidence that it is the original production of a professional sculptor and is in fact a piece of sculpture and a work of art according to the authorities … We sustain the protest.’ During cross-examination, the judge asked the expert, ‘do you mean to tell us that Exhibit 1, if formed up by a mechanic – that is, a first-class mechanic with a file and polishing tools – could not polish that article up?’ In reply, the expert made a critical distinction, ‘he can polish it up, but he cannot conceive of the object. That is the whole point. He cannot conceive those particular lines which give it its individual beauty. That is the difference between a mechanic and an artist: he (the mechanic) cannot conceive as an artist.’ The judge then asked, ‘if he can conceive, then he would cease to be a mechanic and become an artist?’. The expert replied, ‘would become an artist; that is right.’ Based upon this reasoning, arguably a Hologram is capable of being art – see: https://lnkd.in/eJMnwfcw. If a Holgram is art, then logically it follows that in principle artists’ may have moral rights which can give rise to commercial claims. This is also linked to the existence of intellectual property rights in AI. See also: https://lnkd.in/ehG3jrsn.