‘The UK Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal in the
‘midnight deadline’ case of In Matthew
& Ors v Sedman & Ors [2021], in which the current
trustees of a will trust are suing its former professional trustees for failing
to lodge a compensation claim against a third party before the bar date had
expired. ‘The case turned on whether a complete undivided day following the expiry
of the six-year statutory time limit for actions founded on tort should be
included when calculating the limitation period’. (STEP UK News Digest
24.05.2021).
Lord Stephens (with whom Lord Hodge, Lady Arden, Lord Sales and Lord
Burrows agreed) stated:
‘14. The relevant limitation periods are set out in materially
identical terms in the Limitation Act 1980 for each of the causes of
action in these proceedings. Section 2 provides a time limit for actions
founded on tort: “An action founded on tort shall not be brought after the
expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action accrued”.
Section 5 makes provision for a time limit for actions founded on simple
contract: “An action founded on simple contract shall not be brought after
the expiration of six years from the date on which the cause of action
accrued”. Finally, section 21 makes provision for a time limit for actions in
respect of trust property. It is common ground that the relevant time limit is
contained in subsection (3) which, in so far as material, provides that “an
action by a beneficiary … in respect of any breach of trust, …, shall not
be brought after the expiration of six years from the date on which the
right of action accrued” (emphasis added to each).
47. I consider that the reason for
the general rule which directs that the day of accrual of the cause of
action should be excluded from the reckoning of time is that the law rejects
a fraction of a day. The justification for that rule is straightforward;
it is intended to prevent part of a day being counted as a whole day for
the purposes of limitation, thereby prejudicing the claimant and interfering
with the time periods stipulated in the Limitation Act 1980. However,
in this case it was, in my opinion correctly, submitted that in a
midnight deadline case even if the cause of action accrued at the very start of
the day following midnight, that day was a complete undivided day. I
consider that it would impermissibly transcend practical reality if the stroke
of midnight or some infinitesimal division of a second after midnight, led to
the conclusion that the concept of an undivided day was no longer appropriate.
In that sense this would not only be impermissible metaphysics but also, in
this context, such a minimum period of time does not cross the threshold as
capable of being recognised by the law. Whether the issue is framed in
terms of metaphysics, which the common law eschews, or of the principle that
the law does not concern itself with trifling matters, the conclusion is the
same: realistically, there is no fraction of a day. That being so, the
justification in relation to fractions of a day does not apply in a midnight
deadline case. During oral submissions Mr Cousins QC, in answer to an
enquiry from Lady Arden seeking to identify the rational justification for
excluding a whole indivisible day from the calculation of the reckoning of
time, sought to do so based on continuing the application of the rule, as he
submitted it had been understood since the 18th century, so that in relation to
something as important as limitation there should be continuity of
interpretation. I reject the premise to that submission. As I have
indicated there is no long-standing authority which excluded a whole
indivisible day. Furthermore, I consider that the premise is
undermined by the decision of Channell J in Gelmini. So, I reject this
argument as a sufficient justification for excluding a whole day from the
reckoning of time in a midnight deadline case. Rather, I prefer to consider the
impact of holding that a full undivided day in a midnight deadline case is to
be excluded from the reckoning of time. If that day were excluded
from the computation of time then the limitation period would be six years and
one complete day. I consider that would unduly distort the six-year limitation
period laid down by Parliament and would prejudice the defendant by lengthening
the statutory limitation period by a complete day.
48. I also consider that the impact
of excluding 3 June 2011 can be seen by applying the criteria suggested
in Radcliffe of imagining a limitation period of one day. If in this
case 3 June 2011 were excluded from the computation and if the limitation
period were a single day, then the impact would be to allow two complete days
within which to commence an action (see para 36 above).
49. I consider
that Gelmini is an exception to the general rule so that any part of
a day (but not a whole day) happening after the cause of action accrues is
excluded from the calculation of the limitation period for the purposes of the
provisions of the Limitation Act with which this appeal is concerned. The 3
June 2011 was a whole day so that it should be included in the computation of
the limitation period.’
Matthew & Ors v
Sedman & Ors [2021] UKSC 19 (21 May 2021) (bailii.org)
