I have posted the following on the ‘Humanitarian Mediation’ page at www.diplomaticlawguide.com
‘If a proxy war requires a proxy solution, then a proxy solution may also avoid a proxy war. This can be obtained through a process of “convergence.” In my draft essay – “Transforming Conflict Through Humanitarian Mediation & Cultural Heritage Diplomacy’ (scroll toward the bottom of the “Humanitarian Mediation” page at www.diplomaticlawguide.com to find), I wrote, “Where a conflict is primarily the result of a ‘clash’ of divergent values, the solution, i.e. peace, hinges upon evolving a method of convergence.” At the end of the talk given by Anoush Ehteshami (Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University) on Tuesday 16 May 2023 to the Centre for Geopolitics at Cambridge University about, “The Geopolitics of China’s Belt & Road Initiative and Western Focus”, I asked – “Is the potential for a strategic ‘convergence’ of US and China’s competing interests in MENA – linked to Belt & Road, a geopolitical ‘pivot’ upon which war can be avoided in the South China seas, i.e. because China can either prosper through Belt & Road or risk war in the South China Seas?” In short, it appears that the US and China do have common strategic interests in MENA, which could be explored in a constructive dialogue e.g. about how to resurrect the JPOA and open the door to infrastructure investment in Iran. Therefore, a “convergence” of US and Chinese interests in MENA could potentially:
– avoid war in the South China Seas/Taiwan, by enabling China’s economic expansion through BRI in MENA, i.e. if economic expansion can thereby overtake China’s domestic politics of reunification in the psychology of China’s leadership and political elite – as it did under Deng (which is why the West did not fear China’s rise);
– restore US-Iran relations, by opening the door to business through e.g. US/European/Chinese/Iranian commercial joint-venture infrastructure projects;
– bring peace, affluence, and stability throughout the MENA region (and eventually throughout the continent of Africa?); and
– thereby curb migration i.e. if economic migrants from MENA/Africa, seek jobs where the money is in MENA, instead of migrating to Europe.
It would also drive a wedge between China and Russia, and weaken the resolve of other autocrats to follow in Russia’s footsteps, because they would be excluded from sharing in the economic benefits of participation e.g. in the building of infrastructure and re-construction projects.’
You can listen to the full answer to my question when the Centre for Geopolitics post the recording of the talk on its website https://lnkd.in/e4bTe_Vz
The post referred to above which appears on the ‘Geopolitical Challenges’ page of the Diplomatic Law Guide was as follows:
‘Is the potential for “convergence” in MENA a geopolitical “pivot” upon which war can be avoided in the South China seas?’
In my draft essay – ‘Transforming Conflict Through Humanitarian Mediation & Cultural Heritage Diplomacy’ (see ‘Humanitarian Mediation’ page of this website) I wrote, ‘Where a conflict is primarily the result of a “clash” of divergent values, the solution, i.e. peace, hinges upon evolving a method of convergence.’ On Tuesday, Professor Jonathan Fulton, gave a talk to the Centre for Geopolitics at Cambridge University about the ‘Geopolitical Challenges of China’s Growing Influence in the Gulf.’ During the talk, I wondered whether an opportunity exists for ‘convergence’ between US and Chinese interests in MENA, as a diplomatic tool (along with the participation of regional partners), for engineering stability and peace in the region? In his article, ‘China is trying to create a wedge between the US and Gulf allies. Washington should take note.’ (See the link above), Professor Fulton observes that ‘recent events indicate that leaders in Beijing are no longer satisfied with the logic of strategic hedging and are pursuing a more muscular approach to the Gulf’. On 9 May, Tong Zhao wrote an article in ‘Foreign Affairs’ – ‘How China’s Echo Chamber Threatens Taiwan,’ warning that, ‘the main factor that will determine whether Washington and Beijing come to blows over Taiwan is not necessarily Xi’s strategy for unification but the idiosyncrasies of China’s political system. The dynamics among China’s political leadership, its policy elite, and the broader public have generated an internal feedback loop that is not entirely within Xi’s comprehension or control. This could result in China’s being fully mobilized for war even without Xi deciding to attack Taiwan.’ (See link above). For ‘homoeostasis’ to re-assert itself and supplant the internal ‘feedback loop’ about Taiwan in ‘domestic’ and international policy making, is it possible to diplomatically engineer ‘convergence’ in MENA to: (i) bring about a re-orientation of China’s strategy in the region (i.e. so that US preponderance in MENA is not threatened); and (ii) generate economic and cultural benefits for China (i.e. through increased trade and cultural exchange with Europe and MENA) that will outweigh/’trump’ domestic political imperatives about reunification with Taiwan in the psychology of China’s political elite, i.e. because China can either prosper through Belt & Road or risk war? That is a question I will put at the forthcoming talk about ‘The Geopolitics of China’s Belt & Road Initiative and Western Focus’ on 16 May by Anoush Ehteshami (Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University): https://lnkd.in/e4bTe_Vz
The question I put at the talk was – ‘Is the potential for a strategic “convergence” of US and China’s competing interests in MENA – linked to Belt & Road, a geopolitical “pivot” upon which war can be avoided in the South China seas, i.e. because China can either prosper through Belt & Road or risk war in the South China Seas?’ For the answer listen to the answer to the second question in the Q&Q session in the recording – which I will post here when I receive it. In short, the US and China do have common strategic interests in MENA, which could be explored in a constructive dialogue e.g. about how to resurrect the JPOA and open the door to infrastructure investment in Iran, which is sitting on approximately 29.6 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves which accounts for 16% of the world’s total reserves. This places Iran behind Russia with the second largest gas reserves worldwide. Iran also has more mineral deposits than Russia, which could be mined and exported. Iran is also uniquely situated at the confluence of Europe, MENA, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Therefore, if my Theory about ‘Convergence’ is intellectually robust, a ‘convergence’ of US and Chineese interests in MENA could:
- avoid war in the South China Seas/Taiwan, by enabling China’s economic expansion through BRI in MENA, i.e. if economic expansion can thereby overtake China’s domestic politics of reunification in the psychology of China’s leadership and political elite – as it did under Deng (which is why the West did not fear China’s rise);
- restore US-Iran relations, by opening the door to business through e.g. US/European/Chineese/Iranian commercial joint-venture infrastructure projects;
- bring peace, affluence, and stability througout the MENA region (and eventually throughout the continent of Africa?); and
- thereby curb migration i.e. if economic migrants from MENA/Africa, seek jobs where the money is in MENA, instead of migrating to Europe.
See also:
Middle East/North Africa (MENA) | United States Trade Representative (ustr.gov)